The greatest naval conflict in history broke out almost seventy years ago. Richard Hough presents here a reassessment of what happened and why.
It is a history as much of men as of ships: the admirals of the Grand Fleet and their Commander-in-Chief, Sir John Jellicoe; and the men at the Admiralty, among them the reformer, inspirer, and charmer, 'Jacky' Fisher, and Winston Churchill — arrogant, opinionated, but prodigiously hardworking — who between them succeeded in dragging the Royal Navy out of its serenely complacent nineteenth-century condition and preparing it for its first great campaign for more than a hundred years.
Richard Hough describes the years leading up to 1914, the Kaiser's burning resentment of Britain's unchallenged supremacy at sea, and the headlong race to war, accelerated by the construction of the Dreadnought, the biggest, fastest, and most heavily gunned battleship in the world. During the course of the war there were shocks and disappointments for both sides. The Royal Navy found itself dogged by a lack of secure bases, over-rigid battle orders, uncoordinated planning, and poor signalling. Operations, from the North Sea to the South Atlantic, were carried out against a background of feuds, scheming, and personality clashes at the Admiralty.
Was there 'something wrong with our bloody ships', to echo David Beatty at Jutland? Could the appalling losses have been avoided during the Dardanelles campaign? Why were crucial signals received at the Admiralty filed instead of being acted upon? The Battle of Jutland was the greatest naval battle of the war, but also the greatest disappointment: who was really to blame for the inconclusive outcome?
But despite the losses and the mistakes, the brilliance and courage of many men shine through: the invaluable decoding work of 'Room 40'; the resilience of the commanders; the unfailing bravery and high morale of the men on the lower decks; and the excellent relationship between the
British and American Navies towards the end of the war.
It is Richard Hough's contention that the Royal Navy not only beat the Kriegsmarine without resort to a bloody Trafalgar, but that its unrelenting pressure was the prime factor which led to the defeat on land of the Central Powers by the end of 1918. This account shows how that victory was achieved between 4 August 1914 and the abject surrender of the High Seas Fleet over four years later.
Richard Hough published his first book of naval history twenty-five years ago, The Fleet that had to Die, which ran in The New Yorker and was widely translated. Since then his subjects have ranged from Captains Bligh and Cook to Admirals von Spee and 'Jacky' Fisher. He has travelled widely in connection with his maritime writing, and has been associated with the work of the Navy Records Society as Council Member and Vice-Chairman. He lives in the Cotswolds with his publisher wife, Judy Taylor.

Jacket illustration: details from Panorama of Battle of Jutland, 1920, by Robert Smith. By kind permission of the Trustees of the Imperial War Museum.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
ISBN 0 19 215871 6

Contents

LIST OF PLATES
LIST OF MAPS
PREFACE
ABBREVIATIONS

1. 'AN ENORMOUS SHIP'
The influence of the German Emperor — Britain's new alliances — Admiral Fisher appointed First Sea Lord — The need for naval reforms — The conception of the Dreadnought, and her critics
2. THE ANGLO-GERMAN BATTLESHIP RACE
Admiral Fisher's attributes — The dreadnought race begins — Admiral Beresford's vendetta against Fisher — The German Emperor's intransigence — The dreadnought battle-cruiser — The 'We want eight and we won't wait' campaign and Winston Churchill's opposition — The Prime Minister's committee to enquire into the conduct of naval affairs — Fisher's resignation
3. CHURCHILL AT THE ADMIRALTY
Churchill becomes First Lord following the Agadir Crisis — Admiral Wilson superseded — Churchill's over-extended travels, lack of tact, and disagreement with the King — The 15-inch gun and Queen Elizabeth class of super-dreadnought — Churchill switches the Navy to oil — His enthusiasm for submarines and aviation — Fisher's support and guidance — Percy Scott's director and the opposition to it — Dreyer's fire control system — The creation of a Naval War Staff — Lower-deck reform
4. THE ACCELERATION TOWARDS WAR
Relative dreadnought construction figures, and the worsening relations with Germany — The Hankey mission and Churchill's proposed 'naval holiday' — Austrian and Italian dreadnought construction and the Mediterranean scene — Opposition to the withdrawal of British strength from the Mediterranean — Ever-increasing naval expenditure — The qualities of British and German dreadnoughts compared — Inferior British mines and torpedoes — British and German personnel, their training and contrasting characters — The shortage of exceptional talent among British and German admirals
5. WAR AND EARLY MIXED FORTUNES
The July 1914 Test Mobilization — Battenberg's order to 'stand the Fleet fast' — The close blockade of Germany, and its consequences — The lack of east-coast bases: a weakness revealed — jellicoe as C.-in-C. — The submarine and mine perils — The loss of three armoured cruisers and the super-dreadnought Audacious — Frustration and pessimism among Grand Fleet commanders — The Battle of Heligoland Bight a tonic, but Staff weaknesses exposed
6. MEDITERRANEAN MISFORTUNES
Admiral Milne's responsibilities — The Goeben threat — She shows a clean pair of heels — Unclear Admiralty instructions — Admiral Souchon's shadower — Admiral Troubridge's opportunity and failure to exploit it — A false report from London — Milne's dilemma — The Goeben successfully finds her way to Constantinople — Dire consequences for the Allies
7. TRAGEDY IN THE PACIFIC
The search for Admiral Spee — His interference with Pacific commerce and troop movements — Admiral Cradock takes up the hunt in the Atlantic, and, later, off the Chilean coast — His inadequate force — Spee at Easter Island, Cradock at the Falkland Islands — The clash off Coronel and defeat of Cradock — Escape of the Glasgow — The mystery of the Canopus
8. TROUBLE IN THE ADMIRALTY, TRIUMPH IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC
The persecution and resignation of Prince Louis of Battenberg — The reinstatement of Fisher as First Sea Lord against the King's judgement — Countermeasures against Admiral von Spee — Admiral Sturdee sails with his battle-cruiser squadron — Captain Luce joins him — Spee doubles the Horn — The Canopus becomes a fortress — Sturdee arrives at the Falkland Islands — Spee decides to attack and faces a surprise British squadron — The pursuit and defeat of Spee — The aftermath of mixed spite and adulation
9. FIRST CLASH OF THE DREADNOUGHTS
The paramountcy of the battle-cruiser — Defensive German strategy — British intelligence superiority and the creation of Room 40, which predicts a battle-cruiser raid — Poor signalling and sudden poor visibility preclude an interception by Admiral Beatty — Fisher calls the operation 'a hash' — The Dogger Bank pursuit and engagement of Admiral Hipper — The battle a conditional British victory — Beatty anger and frustration — The controversial aftermath
10. THE DARDANELLES FIASCO AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The need to assist Russia and the search for a diversion — The Baltic project and associated island-seizing enterprises — The Fisher—Hankey amphibious Gallipoli plan — Churchill embraces the Navy-only solution — The record unfavourable to naval attacks on forts — Early Gallipoli bombardments confirm the historical view — Air support shunned by gunnery officers — The mine menace and heavy battleship losses — The War Council authorizes landings — Fisher's growing disenchantment and resentment — The final rift, Fisher's resignation and the fall of Churchill
11. THE UNDERSEA WAR
The opening of U-boat warfare — Strong internal division in Germany on the breaking of international law and the pursuit of unrestricted U-boat warfare against merchantmen — The 'hawks' prevail — The Lusitania torpedoing and hostile American reaction — Early German U-boat losses — Fisher and the founding of the British submarine force — Hazardous and productive operations in the Baltic — The Dardanelles campaign and the equal daring and skill of British submarine crews in the Straits and Sea of Marmora — The development of the RNAS and early operations at Gallipoli
12. THE SEARCH FOR DECISIVE ACTION
The new team at the Admiralty — Less inspiration, greater steadiness — Jellicoe's concern for his Fleet's strength, his personal health and the health of his admirals — Restlessness for action among both belligerents — The new German C.-in-C. provides a response — The Lowestoft raid — Consequent agitation for swifter defence and counter-action — British and German efforts to trap the enemy with similar plans — Jellicoe's operation pre-empted — The Fleets sail — Their quality compared
13. JUTLAND: BATTLE-CRUISER ACTION
Dearth of intelligence in British and German Fleets — Misleading Admiralty signals to Jellicoe — And his failure to bring his aircraft-carrier — The importance, and belated arrival, of the 15-inch-gunned battleships — 'Enemy in sight' — More signalling failures in the Battle Cruiser Fleet — Germans open fire with singular light advantage — The fierce artillery duel in 'the run to the south' — The first British catastrophes — The flotillas go in — Commodore Goodenough's brilliant scouting — The appearance of the High Seas Fleet — Beatty reverses his course — 5th Battle Squadron takes a beating but gives as good as it receives
14. JUTLAND: BATTLE FLEETS IN ACTION
The Grand Fleet's deployment dilemma and Jellicoe's decisiveness — Admiral Hood engages the enemy — Hipper's shock at discovering more of the enemy offset by further successes — The end of the Defence and Invincible a preliminary to the main fleets' contact — Scheer's first turn-about and retreat — The manoeuvre repeated — Hipper's `death ride' — Brief renewed contact — The blind ride to the south — Night actions — Chances missed by the Grand Fleet before the High Seas Fleet reaches safety at dawn
15. JUTLAND: A RETROSPECTION
The need for GFBOs , but their needlessly detailed, restrictive and defensive nature — Jellicoe's unwillingness to consider alterations to them — Contrasting qualities of British and German men o'war — The flash' clue to battle-cruiser losses and the attribution of blame — British shell and the reasons for its poor quality — Gunnery records examined — British weakness in reporting and signalling, and its cause — Admiralty failure to inform Jellicoe of intercepted German signals — The absence of the Campania possibly a grave loss to the Grand Fleet — Post-engagement speculations and the acrimonious aftermath to the battle — The performance of individual commanders
16. THE DEFEAT OF THE U-BOAT, SURRENDER, AND SCUTTLE
Post-Jutland reforms — The 19 August sortie — Jackson replaced by Jellicoe, Balfour by Carson, at the Admiralty — The advent of unrestricted U-boat warfare — The Navy's countermeasures inadequate — Jellicoe's resistance to the introduction of convoy — American entry into the war — Convoy again provides the antidote to the guerre de course — Geddes replaces Carson, and Jellicoe's peremptory sacking — Harmony prevails between the RN and USN — The success of the Geddes—Wemyss administration but failure to exploit air power — The abortive Zeebrugge raid — Surrender of the High Seas Fleet

NOTE ON SOURCES
NOTES
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
INDEX

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